LOGIC TEACHING IN THE 21ST CENTURY by Corcoran, John

Abstract
Today we are much better equipped to let the facts reveal themselves to us instead of blinding ourselves to them or stubbornly trying to force 
them into preconceived molds. We no longer embarrass ourselves in front of our students, for example, by insisting that “Some Xs are Y” means 
the same as “Some X is Y”, and lamely adding “for purposes of logic” whenever there is pushback.
 Logic teaching in this century can exploit the new spirit of objectivity, humility, clarity, observationalism, contextualism, tolerance, 
and pluralism. Accordingly, logic teaching in this century can hasten the decline or at least slow the growth of the recurring spirit of subjectivity, 
intolerance, obfuscation, and relativism.
 Besides the new spirit there have been quiet developments in logic and its history and philosophy that could radically improve logic 
teaching. One rather conspicuous example is that the process of reﬁning logical terminology has been productive. Future logic students will no 
longer be burdened by obscure terminology and they will be able to read, think, talk, and write about logic in a more careful and more rewarding 
manner.
 Closely related is increased use and study of variable-enhanced natural language as in “Every proposition x that implies some 
proposition y that is false also implies some proposition z that is true”.
 Another welcome development is the culmination of the slow demise of logicism. No longer is the teacher blocked from using 
examples from arithmetic and algebra fearing that the students had been indoctrinated into thinking that every mathematical truth was a 
tautology and that every mathematical falsehood was a contradiction.
 A further welcome development is the separation of laws of logic from so-called logical truths, i.e., tautologies. Now we can teach the 
logical independence of the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction without fear that students had been indoctrinated into thinking that 
every logical law was a tautology and that every falsehood of logic was a contradiction. This separation permits the logic teacher to apply logic in 
the clariﬁcation of laws of logic.
 This lecture expands the above points, which apply equally well in ﬁrst, second, and third courses, i.e. in “critical thinking”, 
“deductive logic”, and “symbolic logic”.
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If you by your rules would measure what with your rules doth not agree, forgetting all your 
learning, seek ye ﬁrst what its rules may be.
—Richard Wagner, Die Meistersinger.
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Logical thinking in mathematics can be learned only by 
observation and experience. In fact, the ability to reason 
correctly and to understand correct reasoning is itself a 
prerequisite to the study of formal logic. 
—Solomon Feferman, The Number Systems. 1964.  
Introduction 
 The plan of this lecture is to expand each 
of the six themes contained in the abstract, each 
with its own section. Each such thematic section 
begins with a quote from the abstract.  Within 
each of the thematic sections, connections will be 
made to the other sections and to the references. 
None of the sections are deﬁnitive: all raise more 
issues than they settle. This is in keeping with the 
new spirit treated in the next section below. Logic 
teachers in the 21st century no longer have to 
pretend that logic is a completed monolith or 
seamless tapestry of established truths—or even 
that it is moving toward being such. New 
knowledge reveals new awareness of o ld 
ignorance. New knowledge also begs many 
questions. Can this result be improved? How can 
this result be applied? And many more. The goals 
of logic study are not limited to acquisition of 
truths but include acquisition of expertise 
(“Inves t iga t ing knowledge and opin ion” , 
Corcoran-Hamid 2015).  
Moreover, logic teachers do not need to pretend 
to be inculcating truths or even to be telling the 
truth to their students. My 1999 essay “Critical 
thinking and pedagogical license”, written to be 
read by students of logic, makes it clear that there 
is room in logic teaching for telling untruths and 
for letting the students in on the fact that effective 
teaching requires deviation from fact. 
Like other sciences, there are ﬁve distinct kinds 
of knowledge in logic to be shared wi th 
students—not imparted to them: objectual, 
operational, propositional, hypothetical, and 
expert. Brieﬂy, objectual knowledge is of objects 
in the broad sense including individuals , 
c o n c e p t s ,  p r o c e s s e s ,  e t c .  O p e r a t i o n a l 
knowledge, or know-how, includes ability to 
observe, judge, deduce, etc. Propositional 
k n o w l e d g e , o r k n o w - t h a t , i s k n o w i n g a 
proposition to be true or to be false. The 
expression hypothetical knowledge may be new 
to some. In the sense used here, I deﬁne 
hypothetical knowledge as knowledge of the 
“openness” of unset t led proposi t ions and 
u n s o l v e d p r o b l e m s .  P a r a d o x i c a l l y p u t , 
hypothetical knowledge is knowledge of what is 
not knowledge, knowing where the uncharted 
territory is: for example, knowing of words 
whose meanings are not clear, knowing of 
propositions not known to be true or false, 
knowing of arguments not known to be valid or 
invalid, the list goes on and on. 
 This deﬁnition connects with using the 
noun hypothesis for “proposition not known to be 
true and not known to be false”: we have no other 
word for this important concept. Although every 
proposition is either true or false, not every 
proposition is either known to be true or known to 
b e f a l s e . U s i n g t h i s t e r m i n o l o g y, e v e r y 
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proposition is either known to be true, known to 
be false, or a hypothesis.
 Experts are valued for sharing their 
“ignorance”—which is a paradoxical way of 
saying that they are valued for revealing what 
they don’t know—their hypothetical knowledge. 
In fact, experts are often valued as much for 
revealing what they don’t know as for revealing 
wha t t hey do know—the i r p ropos i t i ona l 
knowledge (Corcoran-Hamid 2015). 
 Expertise, the ﬁfth kind of knowledge, 
includes the practical and theoretical experience 
acquired over years of engagement with a 
discipline’s reality. It includes the expert’s feel 
for the subject and the expert’s engagement with 
the reality the subject is about. Moreover it 
uniﬁes and inter-relates the other four kinds of 
k n o w l e d g e .  T h e  e x p e r t ’s  h y p o t h e t i c a l 
knowledge is one of the fuels that keep a 
discipline alive and growing. 
 The recognition of the variety of kinds of 
knowledge alerts students of what they have and 
what they are gaining; it also alerts them of what 
they might be missing and what their textbooks 
might be missing. In earlier times, only two of 
these ﬁve were explicitly recognized and even 
then not to the extent recognized today. For 
example, Galen recognized only a kind of 
objectual knowledge—of “universals” such as 
“ h u m a n ” ,  “ d o g ” ,  a n d  “ o l i v e ” — a n d 
propositional knowledge—such as that the sun is 
hot (Galen 200? /1964, pp.31f, 55f). Over a 
millennium later, William of Ockham was in the 
same rut (William of Ockham 1330?/1990, 
pp.18ff). Overtones of this epistemic dichotomy 
can be found today, fo r example , in the 
dichotomy of “primitive notions” and “primitive 
sentences” in Tarski 1941/1995 and in Tarski 
repeated juxtaposition of deﬁnability with 
provability. Today we recognize much more. For 
example, the capacity to generate sentences is a 
k i n d o f o p e r a t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e a n d t h e 
knowledge of “primitive rules” is in a way 
objectual and in a way operational. 
§1. Objectivity and pluralism
 
 Of tha t which rece ives prec i se formula t ion in 
mathematical logic, an important part is already vaguely present 
as a basic ingredient of daily discourse. The passage from non-
mathematical, non-philosophical common sense to the ﬁrst 
technicalities of mathematical logic is thus but a step, quickly 
taken. Once within the ﬁeld, moreover, one need not travel to its 
farther end to reach a frontier; the ﬁeld is itself a frontier, and 
investigators are active over much of its length. Even within an 
introductory exposition there is room for novelties which may not 
be devoid of interest to the specialist.—Quine 1940, Preface. 
  Today we are much better equipped to let the facts reveal 
themselves to us instead of blinding ourselves to them or 
stubbornly trying to force them into preconceived molds. We no 
longer embarrass ourselves in front of our students, for example, 
by insisting that ‘Some Xs are Y’ means the same as ‘Some X is Y’, 
and lamely adding “for purposes of logic” when there is 
pushback.   
  Logic teaching in this century can exploit the new spirit 
o f  o b j e c t i v i t y,  h u m i l i t y,  c l a r i t y,  o b s e r v a t i o n a l i s m , 
contextualism, tolerance, and pluralism. Accordingly, logic 
teaching in this century can hasten the decline or at least slow the 
growth of the recurring spirit of subjectivity, intolerance, 
obfuscation, and relativism. 
 Wishful thinking, a c lose f r iend of 
laziness and a sworn enemy of objectivity, has 
played such an embarrassing role in the history of 
logic that many of us cringe at the mere hint of its 
appearance. The transition from the feeling “it 
would be nice if all Xs were Ys” to the belief 
“certainly all Xs are Ys” is so easy it sometimes 
feels like an implication. And when it becomes 
too obvious that not all Xs are Ys, then is the time 
to drag out “certainly all Xs are reducible to Ys” 
or “certainly all Xs are transformable into Ys” or 
“Xs may be regarded as Ys”. Rarely is the point 
made that when we are told explicitly that Xs may 
b e r e g a r d e d a s Y s , t h e r e i s a t l e a s t t h e 
suggestion—if not a tacit admission—that Xs are 
not Ys.  
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 By the way, to see that ‘Some Xs are Y’ 
does not mean the same as ‘Some X is Y’, one may 
notice that “Some prime numbers are even” is 
false: 2 is the only prime number that is even: no 
two prime numbers are even. But, “Some prime 
number is even” is true: the proexample is 2. See 
C o r c o r a n 2 0 0 5 :  “ C o u n t e r e x a m p l e s a n d 
Proexamples”. To be explicit, “Some prime 
numbers are even” amounts to “Two or more 
prime numbers are even”. Although in general 
‘some’ with a singular amounts to ‘at least one’, 
nevertheless with a plural it amounts to ‘two or 
more’ : the meaning of ‘ some’ i s context 
dependent. There are many other examples. 
From set theory we have the truth “Some set is 
empty” juxtaposed with the falsehood “Some 
sets are empty”. Many otherwise excellent texts 
o v e r l o o k t h i s  p o i n t .  S e e  C o h e n - N a g e l 
1934/1993, pp. 42ff. 
 We no longer regard, for example, ‘Every 
X is Y”—where ‘Y’ must stand for an adjective 
a n d  ‘ i s ’  i n d i c a t e s  p r e d i c a t i o n — a s 
interchangeable with ‘Every X is a Y”—where 
‘Y’ must stand for a noun and ‘is’ indicates 
identity. Russell, Parry, Smiley, and others all 
arrived at the same conclusion. See Corcoran 
2008a: “Aristotle’s many-sorted logic”.  
 And we no longer pretend that the two-
word expression ‘is a’ before a common noun 
expresses the membership relation and that the 
common noun following is really a proper name 
of a class. See my 2013 “Errors in Tarski’s 1983 
truth-deﬁnition paper”.  The is of identity can 
make a predicate out of a proper name as in ‘two 
plus one is three’, where ‘two plus one’ is the 
subject and ‘is three’ the predicate. The is of 
predication can make a predicate out of an 
adjective as in ‘two plus one is odd’ where ‘two 
plus one’ is the subject and  ‘is odd’ the predicate. 
A verb phrase for membership—such as ‘belongs 
to’ or ‘is a member of’ resembles the is of identity 
in that it can make a predicate out of a proper 
name as in ‘two plus one belongs to the class of 
odd numbers’ where ‘two plus one’ is the subject 
and ‘belongs to the class of odd numbers’ the 
predicate. But the proper name must be a name of 
a class.  
 We no longer try to “reduce” one of these 
three to one of the other two. The question of what 
if anything one of these has in common with 
either of the other two we leave to future 
logicians; the teacher need not pretend to know 
the last word. 
 We no longer call the adverb ‘not’ a 
conjunction or a connective, and we don’t force it 
to mean “non” or “it is not the case that” or, even 
worse, “it is false that”. Of course there are cases 
where ‘not’ is naturally interchangeable with ‘it 
is not that’ and ‘it is not the case that’: in front of 
‘every’ as in ‘not every prime number is odd’. But 
such situations are rare: ‘not some integer is 
divisible by zero’ is ungrammatical but ‘no 
integer is divisible by zero’ is true, of course. 
 We no longer say that the word ‘nothing’ is 
a name of the null set, or worse, a name of the 
number zero. We no longer use ‘equals’ to mean 
“is”: (2 + 3) is 5; there is only one integer between 
4 and 6—call it ‘(2 + 3)’, call it ‘5’, or call it by one 
of its other names. See Corcoran-Ramnauth 
2013: “Equality and identity”. Using ‘equals’ for 
‘is’ in arithmetic may be a vestige of a time when 
people thought that (2 + 3) wasn’t 5 itself, but 
only an equal of 5. And that mistake may have 
been reinforced by failing to make the use-
mention distinction: the seven-character name 
‘(2 + 3)’ isn’t the one-character name ‘5’, but they 
name the same number—which some people 
might regard as a kind of equality. Tarski 
discusses these mistakes in 1941/1995. When ‘=’ 
is used for identity as opposed to equality, it  
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would be better to call it the is sign and not the 
equals sign. We try to avoid expressions that 
encourage or even tolerate distorted views of the 
logical structure of language and we encourage 
our students to point out such expressions.
The string ‘(2 + 3)’ has seven-characters: two 
parentheses, two digits, one plus sign, and two 
spaces. See the 1974 “String Theory” and the 
2006 “Schemata”. 
 If the logic you know exhausts all logic, 
your work learning logic is ﬁnished. And if you 
believe that the logic you know exhausts all 
logic, why should you look for places it doesn’t 
work? After all, you are sure there are none. And 
w h e n d o u b t s c r e e p i n ,  a p o l o g e t i c s a n d 
rationalization come to the rescue; and if you are 
desperate, invoking famous authorities might 
help. 
 My primary goal in logic teaching is to 
connect the students to the reality logic is about, 
not to indoctrinate the students in the opinions of 
famous logicians or to drill them in the currently 
fashionable manipulations. The aim is to bring 
ou t the s tuden t ’s na t ive ab i l i t y to make 
autonomous judgments and perhaps correct or 
even overthrow the current paradigms—not to 
swell the ranks of orthodoxy. Even worse than the 
enthusiastic orthodox logicians are those who 
lack a sense of logical reality and who therefore 
treat logic like ﬁction, spinning out one new 
artiﬁcial system after the other, all equally 
empty. 
 What do I mean by logical reality? What 
do I mean by physical reality? What do I mean by 
mathematical reality? What do I mean by reality? 
A “formal deﬁnition” is out of the question, but 
helpful things can be said. In keeping with 
normal usage, reality is what a person refers to in 
making an objective judgment. There are as 
many aspects to logical reality as there are 
categories of logical judgments. See Corcoran 
2009: “Sentence , p ropos i t ion , judgment , 
statement, fact”. I asked Frango Nabrasa how he 
explains reality to people uncomfortable about 
the word ‘reality’. His answer: “Reality is what 
people agree about when they actually agree and 
what people disagree about when they actually 
disagree”. For uses of the word ‘reality’ in a 
logical context see, e.g., Russell’s Introduction 
to Wittgenstein 1922. 
 How is the reality that logic studies 
accessed? The short answer is “through its 
applications”. A longer answer can be inferred 
from my 1973 article “Gaps between logical 
theory and mathematical practice”.  
 The applications of logic are to living 
s c i e n c e s , t e c h n o l o g i e s , h u m a n i t i e s , a n d 
disciplines—a point emphasized by Tarski, 
Henkin, and others in the Berkeley Logic and 
Methodology Group. Before any logic i s 
discussed in the classroom some content should 
be presented, preferably content already familiar 
to the student or, if not familiar, useful and easily 
grasped. I have in mind arithmetic, algebra (or 
analysis), geometry, set theory, class theory, 
string theory (syntactics), zoology, botany, 
and—perhaps paradoxically—logic itself. 
In particular, before a symbolic argument 
schema is presented, a discipline or disciplines 
and concrete arguments instantiat ing that 
schema should be presented. Of the various ways 
of presenting an argument perhaps the one least 
open to misinterpretation is the premises-line-
conclusion format which consists in listing the 
premises followed by a line followed by the 
conclusion. There is no justiﬁcation, other than 
mindless adherence to tradition, for using an 
inferential adverb such as ‘therefore’, ‘hence’, 
‘so’, or the triple-dot therefore sign ‘ ’ to mark 
the conclusion in a presentation of an argument. 
  JOHN CORCORAN |Logic teaching in the 21st century . | 5 
Quadripartita Ratio: Revista de Argumentación y Retórica 1:1 (2016) 1-05 c  2016
  -  Universidad de Guadalajarawww.revistascientiﬁcas.udg.mx retorica.argumentacion@gmail.com
This confuses the mere presentation of an 
argument for consideration with the statement of 
its validity. We need to present arguments 
without seeming to claim their validity. Actually, 
use of an inferential adverb is even worse than 
that: besides claiming that the conclusion 
follows it seems to claim the truth of the 
p r e m i s e s .  S e e  m y  1 9 7 3  “ M e a n i n g s  o f 
implication”, which has been translated into 
Spanish. 
 Here is what I mean: concrete arguments 
from arithmetic, geometry, set theory, and logic 
are presented ﬁrs t and then some related 
schemata a re g iven . See Corcoran 2006: 
“Schemata”. Incidentally, in this paper it looked 
nicer to underline the last premise before the 
conclusion than to make a line after the last 
premise. This will not work for zero-premise 
arguments. Another device that is handy is to 
preﬁx the conclusion with a special character 
having inferential connotations, for example, a 
question mark. 
Every number divides itself. 
Every even number divides itself. 
 
Every triangle resembles itself. 
Every equilateral triangle resembles itself. 
 
Every set contains itself. 
Every ﬁnite set contains itself. 
 
Every proposition implies itself. 
Every false proposition implies itself. 
 
 For future reference below, note that the 
above four arguments are in the same form. It will 
be important to remind ourselves of one of the 
ways an argument can be used as a template for 
generating the others.
 
Th is method wi l l be fo rm-prese rv ing : i t 
generates from one argument new arguments 
having the same form. The simplest form-
preserving transformation is the operation of 
substituting one new non-logical term for every 
occurrence of a given non-logical term. By ‘new’ 
here is meant “not already occurring in the 
argument operated on” and, of course, the 
semantic category of the new term must be the 
same as the one it replaces. For example, 
“number” can replace “integer” but it cannot 
replace “one”, “even”, “divides”, “square-root”, 
“plus”, etc.  
 The operation just described is called one-
n e w - t e r m - s u b s t i t u t i o n . E v e r y a rg u m e n t 
obtained from a given argument by a ﬁnite 
sequence of one-new-term substitutions is in the 
same logical form as the given argument. And 
conversely, every argument in the same logical 
form as a given argument is obtained from the 
given argument by a ﬁnite sequence of one-new-
term subs t i tu t ions—as long as the g iven 
argument involves only ﬁnitely many non-
logical terms.  
 Extending this result to the case of 
arguments involving inﬁnitely many non-logical 
terms is a mere technicality. Some people will 
want to take the above as a formal, “ofﬁcial”, 
deﬁnition of the relation of “being-in-the-same-
form-as” . Compare wi th Corcoran 1989: 
“Argumentations and logic”, pages 27ff. 
Such concrete, material arguments should 
precede abstract, formal schemas, or schemata, 
such as the following. 
Every N Rs itself. 
Every A N Rs itself. 
Every N x is such that xRx. 
Every N x is such that if x is A, then xRx. 
 P 
Q 
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Presenting argument schemas in the absence of 
their concrete instances alienates students from 
their native logical intuitions and gives them a 
d i s t o r t e d  s e n s e  o f  l o g i c .  I t  h a s  l e d  t o 
misconceptions such as that the primary subject 
matter of logic is logical forms or even schemata. 
It has even led to the view that logical reality 
excludes concrete arguments. It is also a mistake 
to call argument schemas by the expression 
schematic arguments: they are schemas and not 
arguments. Presenting argument schemas in the 
presence of their concrete instances is one of the 
p r a c t i c e s  I  a d v o c a t e  u n d e r  t h e  r u b r i c 
“contextualization”. The same sentiment is in the 
1981 Preface to Quine 1940: 
 
 I used no schemata but referred only to their instances, 
the actual sentences, […]. I did not settle for open sentences, with 
free variables, but insisted on closed sentences, true and false. My 
reason was that these are what logic is for; schemata and even 
open sentences are technical aids along the way. Quine 1940, 
1981 Preface, iv. 
 
 Along with schemata and open sentences 
to be classiﬁed as “technical aids”, Quine would 
have added logical forms if he had thought of it. 
To be perfectly clear, I go a little further and say 
that I think teaching propositional logic ﬁrst is a 
disservice to the students. Time has come to 
refute the myths that propositional logic is 
“primary”, that it is presupposed by all other 
logics, and that it deserves some sort of exalted 
status. I do not teach propositional logic as a 
separate logic but as integral to basic logic. 
C o r c o r a n 2 0 0 1 :  “ S e c o n d - o r d e r  l o g i c ” . 
Moreover, I do not even mention “prothetic” or 
“quan t iﬁed p ropos i t i ona l l og i c”—which 
doesn’t even make sense. See Section 6 below. As 
a ﬁrst, introductory system of logic, I teach 
identity logic whose only logical constants are 
identity and inidentity. Corcoran-Ziewacz 1979: 
“Identity Logics”. Here are some examples of 
valid premise-conclusion arguments in identity 
logic. 
+0 = 0 
-0 = 0 
+0 = -0 
 
+0 = 0 
-0 = 0 
-0 = +0 
 
+0 = 0 
+0 ≠ 1 
  0 ≠ 1 
 
+0 = 0 
+0 ≠ 1 
  1 ≠ 0 
 
√0 = +0 
+0 =  -0 
-0 =    0 
  0 = √0 
§2. History and philosophy 
Here and elsewhere we shall not have the best insight into 
things until we see them growing from their beginnings. 
—Aristotle 
 
Besides the new spirit there have been quiet developments in 
logic and its history and philosophy that could radically 
improve logic teaching. 
 
 Today more than ever before, we are alert to the 
human practices that gave rise to the living 
discipline we call logic: logic arises ﬁrst as an 
attempt to understand proof or demonstration, 
a l t e r n a t i v e l y — i n a b r o a d e r s e t t i n g — t o 
unders tand the axiomat ic method and i t s 
presuppositions. This point of view is attested in 
the ﬁrst paragraph of the book that marks the 
historical origin of logic: Aristotle’s Prior 
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Analytics. It is echoed, ampliﬁed, and updated in 
Cohen and Nagel’s classic Introduction to Logic 
(Cohen-Nagel 1934/1993) . I t i s g iven an 
authoritatively mathematical restatement in the 
ﬁrst paragraph of what is arguably the most 
successful and inﬂuential modern logic text: 
Alfred Tarski’s Introduction to Logic (Tarski 
1 9 4 1 / 1 9 9 5 ) .   A l o n z o C h u r c h ’s  c l a s s i c 
Introduction to Mathematical Logic (Church 
1956) makes a very closely related point on his 
ﬁ rs t page . As ide f rom Galen and Sex tus 
Empiricus, perhaps, this Aristotelian insight was 
largely ignored by logicians until Hilbert, Gödel, 
and others made it stand out. After World War II, 
Bourbaki’s support of it was inﬂuential. See 
Corcoran 2009: “Aristotle's Demonstrative 
Logic”. 
 As soon as the study of axiomatic method 
is undertaken, we slowly become aware that the 
same process of logical deduction used to obtain 
theorems from axioms is also used to obtain 
conclusions from arbitrary premises—whether 
known to be true or not. Evert Beth called this one 
of Aristotle’s most important discoveries even 
though Aristotle never made the point explicitly, 
as far as I know.  
 Thus logic becomes a broader ﬁeld: one 
whose aims include determining whether a given 
conclusion follows from given premises—or, 
what is the same thing, determining whether a 
given premise-conclusion argument is valid. 
Once this is undertaken, we see that the premises 
and conclusions need to be subjected to logical 
analysis—and that our methods of determining 
validity and invalidity need investigation, and so 
on. 
 The concern with determining whether a 
g i v e n  c o n c l u s i o n  f o l l o w s  f r o m g i v e n 
p r e m i s e s — d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a g i v e n 
argument is valid—and the general methodology 
for approaching this concern is one of the 
pe r enn i a l cons t an t s i n l og i c w h ich ge t s 
reconstructed and reafﬁrmed century after 
century starting with Aristotle. I have made this 
point in different ways in several papers. In 
Corcoran-Wood 1980, the very ﬁrst paragraph 
reads as follows. 
It is one thing for a given proposition to follow or to not follow 
from a given set of propositions and it is quite another thing for it 
to be shown either that the given proposition follows or that it 
does not follow. Using a formal deduction to show that a 
conclusion follows and using a countermodel to show that a 
conclusion does not follow are both traditional practices 
recognized by Aristotle and used down through the history of 
logic. These practices presuppose, respectively, a criterion of 
validity and a criterion of invalidity each of which has been 
extended and reﬁned by modern logicians: deductions are studied 
in formal syntax (proof theory) and countermodels are studied in 
formal semantics (model theory). 
 
 T h e m e t h o d o f c o u n t e r m o d e l s ,  o r 
counterinterpretations, which is for establishing 
invalidity, is a complicated and mathematically 
sophisticated form of Aristotle’s method of 
counterarguments. The countermodel method 
h a s  s t r i n g - t h e o r e t i c  a n d  s e t - t h e o r e t i c 
prerequisites making it unsuited for elementary 
logic teaching. However, the counterargument 
method—used by Aristotle long before set 
theory or string theory were discovered—is well 
suited and, moreover, it lends itself to serving as 
an introduction to the method of countermodels. 
 What are the differences between the two 
methods? From a student’s perspective, roughly 
speaking, in the method of counterarguments the 
meanings of the non-logical expressions are 
changed by changing their wordings—examples 
are given in Section 5 below—whereas in the 
method of countermodels the meanings of the 
non-logical expressions are changed without 
changing their wordings: the wordings of the 
non- ogical expressions are ﬁxed but their
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meanings are changed—‘reinterpreted’ is a 
technical term often used. The method of 
countermodels requires separation of wordings 
f r o m m e a n i n g s , s e p a r a t i n g s y n t a x f r o m 
semant ics , which is a prerequis i te to the 
perplexing idea of reinterpretation of a language.  
Admittedly, a historical perspective in logic 
teaching has been rare: Tarski, Church, and 
Quine notwithstanding. But, if my advice is 
followed, it will be increasingly emphasized in 
21st-century logic teaching. 
 Another related feature of 21st-century 
logic teaching will be contextualizing. For 
example, it will not even be sufﬁcient to see logic 
emerge in Aristotle’s mind in response to his 
study of axiomatic method in Plato’s Academy; it 
will be necessary to see Aristotle in his historical 
context: his predecessors and successors. To do 
tha t we could rev iew the se r ies : Tha les , 
Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Euclid, 
Archimedes, Galen. 
§3. Terminology 
The best notation is no notation; whenever possible, avoid 
complicated formalisms.—Paul Halmos 
 
Besides the new spirit, there have been quiet developments in 
logic and its history and philosophy that could radically improve 
logic teaching. One rather conspicuous example is that the 
process of reﬁning logical terminology has been productive. 
Future logic students will no longer be burdened by obscure 
terminology and they will be able to read, think, talk, and write 
about logic in a more careful and more rewarding manner. 
 The goal of producing students who 
conﬁdently and accurately think, speak, and 
write about logic is closely connected to the goal 
of producing students who can access the reality 
logic is about and who can make autonomous 
judgments on logical issues. These goals are 
served by developing the ability to read logical 
writings—a skill that is not innate. Students must 
acquire it for themselves, but a teacher can help. 
One way a teacher can help students to acquire 
this skill is to read aloud to them important 
passages. As linguists know, but students often 
don’t, the mind takes information more directly 
from spoken language than from the written. See 
my 2009 “Sentence, Proposition, Judgment, 
Statement, and Fact: Speaking about the Written 
English Used in Logic”. 
 And do not fail to reread, sometimes two 
or more readings are needed to get the meaning to 
emerge. Also try to get the students to articulate 
what they experience. Encourage the students to 
see not only what the author is saying but also 
h o w t h e  a u t h o r  s a i d  i t :  w h a t  c h o i c e s , 
compromises, and trade-offs were made.  And 
never fail to be interested in the students’ 
interpretations and whether the students agree 
with the author’s decisions. 
 At each stage of a logic course some 
passages will be more appropriate than others. 
Boole, De Morgan, Whitehead, Russell, Tarski, 
Cohen, Nagel, and Quine all produced models of 
lucid and rewarding passages. One of my 
favorites for beginning students is the section 
“Counterexamples and Proexamples” in the 
1993 second edition of the classic Cohen-Nagel 
Introduction to Logic, page xxv. Other gems are 
scattered thoughout this paper. 
 A student asked why my list of logical-
gem writers started with Boole. I could have gone 
back to Ockham, or even Augustine, but there are 
very few before that. It took a long time for our 
predecessors to learn how to write logic. 
 We no longer tolerate logicians who think 
they can escape criticism for confusing or 
misleading language by admitting to i t in 
advance; an abuse of language isn’t corrected by 
being identiﬁed in advance. Logicians don’t earn 
our forgiveness  by  explicitly  forgiving
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t hemse lves . Us ing ‘ exp re s s ion ’ , ‘ t e rm’ , 
‘ concep t ’ , ‘ cond i t i on ’ , and o the r words 
interchangeably is not conducive to learning. 
L i k e w i s e ,  ‘ s e n t e n c e ’ ,  ‘ p r o p o s i t i o n ’ , 
‘judgment’, ‘statement’, ‘assertion’, ‘claim’, 
and ‘fact’ all have their proper and separate 
ranges of uses. See Corcoran 2009: “Sentence,    
 Proposition, Judgment, Statement, and 
Fact”. 
 However much a teacher may dislike a 
ce r t a in w ide ly -used o r t r ad i t i ona l l og i c 
expression, that expression must be discussed in 
class in order for the students to be able to read the 
literature. Pretending that the expression doesn’t 
exist—or that it is universally regarded by all 
competent logicians as a taboo expression—is 
not serving the student. Moreover, many such 
expressions are used differently by different 
logicians and the student needs to know this. An 
a p t e x a m p l e i s t h e w o r d ‘ p r o p o s i t i o n ’ , 
etymologically parallel to the Greek word 
protasis that Aristotle used for the things that 
could serve as premises and as conclusions of 
a r g u m e n t s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i f  t h e  w o r d 
‘proposition’ is not discussed with students, they 
will have trouble ﬁguring out why Quine 1970 
would spend so much time and energy trying to 
persuade people not to use the word. One useful 
paper—accessible with some help to beginning 
students—is my 2011 “Hare and Others on the 
Proposition”. 
 The use-mention distinction, without 
which the Tarski truth-deﬁnition paper would 
have been inconceivable, is essential: ‘10’ is a 
numeral, 10 is a number, and ‘10’ denotes ten in 
Arabic base-ten notation—but ‘10’ denotes two 
in binary or base-two notation. If use-mention 
cannot be done the ﬁrst day, it should be done in 
the ﬁrst week. As important as the use-mention 
distinction is, even more important is the attitude 
that gave rise to it: the motivation to pursue 
logical real i ty and accuracy. People who 
appreciate the use-mention distinction, the 
l o g i c a l  a n a l y s i s  u n d e r l y i n g i t ,  a n d t h e 
terminology created to use it are also ready to 
seek further important distinctions and to seek 
higher levels of precision in logical writing. 
Another s imi lar d is t inc t ion i s the sense-
denotation dichotomy prominent in the writings 
of modern logicians such as Frege, Carnap, and 
Church—but already applied in the ﬁrst sentence 
of Aristotle’s Categories—which begins his 
Organon (Greek for “instrument”), a group of 
writings containing the ﬁrst logic book. Another 
one is the type-token-occurrence distinction, a 
trichotomy that originated in Peirce’s writings 
and that is essential for clarity in discussing 
logic. See my paper on schemata, Corcoran 2006, 
Sect. 3, esp. pp. 228ff. 
 Any introduction to the literature of logic 
must warn students of obstacles such as inept and 
u s e l e s s h i j a c k i n g o f e n t r e n c h e d n o r m a l 
language: logicians have been known to steal 
expressions they didn’t need and would have 
been happier without. Mistakenly explaining ‘is’ 
as ‘is identical with’ is one example. 
 In normal English, ‘Abe is Ben’ means 
roughly “Abe is no-one but Ben”: “Abe and Ben 
are one and the same person”. Using Tarski’s 
terminology, the sentence ‘Abe is Ben’ is true if 
and only if the name ‘Abe’ denotes the person 
Ben. To say that Abe and Ben are alike in relevant 
respects, ‘Abe is identical to Ben’ would be used. 
In fact, a person could say without raising 
eyebrows ‘Abe is identical to Ben even though 
Abe thinks he is superior’. But in logic literature, 
‘Abe is identical to Ben’ means that Abe is no-one 
but Ben, that Abe and Ben are one and the same 
person—uselessly employing ‘identical to’. No 
logician could say ‘Abe is identical to Ben even  
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though Abe thinks he is superior’: that would be 
practically a self-contradiction. Logicians are 
good at compartmentalizing: speaking English 
at home and “Loglish” at work. Aristotle set the 
precedent.  
 A c lose ly re la ted example i s us ing 
‘equals’ where ‘is’ belongs. Once this abuse of 
language is established it is awkward to make 
points such as that every side of an equilateral 
triangle equals both of the other two sides neither 
of which is the other. See Corcoran-Ramnauth 
2013r. It is by no means the case that using 
‘equals’ for ‘is’ is ubiquitous in logic writing. 
Quine 1940 routinely used ‘is’ not ‘equals’, 
where identity is to the point. 
 No discussion of terminology would be 
complete without revealing nearly entrenched 
absurdities the students need to be warned of and 
explicitly excused from. The teacher must 
arrange class terminological and typographical 
conven t ions so tha t wr i t ing log ic i s no t 
unnecessarily tedious. First, the student should 
be excused from the convention of italicizing 
variables instead of leaving them in roman—as if 
there were some sacred taboo that would be 
violated by writing ‘every number x’ in roman 
instead of ‘every number x’ in italic. This 
convention eats up a lot of time better spent on 
other things. Second, the student should be 
excused from compulsive use of quotes. Of 
course, it is important to make sure use-mention 
is observed, but there are other devices that make 
less clutter and use less time. Third, chose 
notat ion that is easy to read and easy to 
remember, e.g. for “and” use & instead of an 
inverted vee; for “the successor of” use ess as in y 
= sx instead of the accent as in y = x` (read ecks-
accent, not ecks-prime). Under this rule comes 
m i n i m i z i n g  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  s u b s c r i p t s , 
superscripts, font changes, foreign alphabets,etc  
 Also, simplify spelling: write ‘premise’ 
not ‘premiss’. By the way, premises rhymes with 
cannabis, not canopies, and processes rhymes 
with auspices, not recipes: if you are ever 
tempted to be fancy—God forbid—check your 
d i c t i o n a r y.  A s  F r a n g o  N a b r a s a  w a r n s , 
mispluralizing English nouns as if they were 
G r e e k o r L a t i n d o e s n ’ t c o m p e n s a t e f o r 
mispluralizing Greek or Latin nouns as if they 
were English. Your logic students trust you to be a 
model speaker of the language of instruction. 
Don’t betray that trust.  
§4. Variable-enhanced language 
The variable ranges over its values but is replaceable by its 
substituents. In arithmetic, the variable has numbers such as zero 
and one as its values but has numerals such as ‘0’ and ‘1’ as its 
substituents.—Frango Nabrasa  
 
Closely related is increased use and study of variable-enhanced 
natural language as in “Every proposition x that implies some 
proposition y that is false also implies some proposition z that is 
true”. 
 One variable-enhanced paraphrase of 
‘every person follows some person’ is ‘every 
person x follows some person y’, but a more 
explicit paraphrase is ‘every person x is such that 
x follows some person y’. The second occurrence 
of x is a pronoun occurrence and the ﬁrst marks 
the antecedent referent of the pronoun. The 
second occurrence refers back to the ﬁrst. Every 
variable occurrence in a well-formed variable-
enhanced English sentence is either a pronoun or 
an antecedent. But not every expression that 
resembles a sentence actually is a sentence, 
either having a truth-value or expressing a 
proposition having a truth-value. Consider ‘x 
follows some person’, where the pronoun lacks 
an antecedent referent as in the unenhanced ‘he 
follows some person’. 
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  Whenever there is a pronoun without an 
antecedent, the expression is not a sentence 
(expressing a proposition), although it could be a 
predicate (expressing a condition): ‘x follows 
some person’ expresses a condition satisﬁed by 
every person who follows some person. See 
Tarski 1941/1995, Sect.1, pp. 5ff. 
 E v e r y a n t e c e d e n t - o c c u r r e n c e o f a 
va r i ab le i s immedia te ly a f t e r a common 
noun—the range-indicator for the variable. The 
common noun person is the range-indicator for 
the two occurrences of variable x in ‘every 
person x is such that x follows some person y’. It 
is also the range-indicator for the occurrence of 
the variable y. But in many sentences there are 
different range-indicators for the occurrences of 
different variables as in ‘every number x is 
denoted by some numeral y’ or ‘every number x is 
the length of some expression y’. 
In many cases, roughly speaking, a range-
indicator is to a variable as a common noun is to a 
pronoun. Church makes a similar point in Church 
1956. 
 Whenever there is an antecedent without a 
pronoun, the expression can be made more 
explicit. For example, in the sentence ‘every 
person x is such that x follows some person y’, the 
last variable-occurrence is an antecedent having 
no pronoun referring back to it. The sentence can 
be made more explicit in multiple ways each 
having its own uses.
 
every person x is such that x follows y for some person 
y 
every person x is such that, for some person y, x 
follows y 
every person x is such that some person y is such that, 
x follows y 
for every person x, some person y is such that x 
follows y 
for every person x, for some person y, x follows y
t is even possible to get the pronoun be to its own 
antecedent.  
          every person x follows some person y 
 Anyway, there are several reasons for 
ﬁne-tuning ones native ability to paraphrase into 
variable-enhanced language including, ﬁrst, to 
understand bet ter the logical form of the 
propositions expressed and, second, to prepare to 
translate into logically perfect languages, e.g., a 
symbolic formalized language. See “Logical 
f o r m ” i n  t h e C a m b r i d g e D i c t i o n a r y o f 
Philosophy, second and third editions. 
 It is my opinion that it is often easier to 
discern logical relations between propositions 
when they are expressed in variable-absent 
language than in fu l ly expl ic i t var iab le-
enhanced language. However, it is often the case 
that logical relations are easier to discern using 
partly variable-enhanced language than either 
unenhanced or fully enhanced. But whatever 
opinion you may have, I hope you articulate it 
carefully and see what its consequences are and 
what might explain it. 
 O n t h e s u b j e c t  o f  t e r m i n o l o g i c a l 
t r a n s p a r e n c y,  w h e n e v e r  v a r i a b l e s  a r e 
introduced, constants should be introduced and 
the constant-variable distinction in logic and 
pure mathematics should be contrasted with the 
constant-variable distinction in science and 
a p p l i e d m a t h e m a t i c s . I n l o g i c a n d p u r e 
mathematics , constants and var iables are 
symbols with contrasting sorts of meanings. In 
science and applied mathematics, constants and 
variables are not symbols but things, quantities 
with contrasting temporal behaviors. 
My weight at this instant is a constant. My weight 
over this month is a variable. My age in years is a 
variable that is constant between birthdays. See 
Tarski 1941/1995, page 3. In the ordinary senses 
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of ‘variable’, there is nothing variable about the 
variables in a given interpreted symbolic-
language sentence or in a given variable-
enhanced natural-language sentence. Logicians 
in the 21st century no longer say that such 
variables have variable meanings or that they 
denote variable things or that they denote 
ambiguously. Moreover, the fact that there may 
be contexts in which a variable is in some natural 
sense variable has nothing to do with why they 
are called variables. 
 Returning to the subject of validity, 
consider the following premise-conclusion 
arguments. 
every person follows some person 
every person follows some person who follows 
some person 
 
every person follows some person 
every person who follows some person follows 
some person 
 
every person follows some person 
every person follows some person who follows 
some person who follows some person 
 
every person follows some person 
every person who follows some person follows 
some person who follows some person 
 I t is easy to see that each of these 
arguments is valid in the sense that its conclusion 
fo l lows f rom i t s p remises , i . e . , t ha t the 
conc lu s ion s imp ly b r i ngs ou t exp l i c i t l y 
information already implicit in the premise—or 
at least does not add any information not in the 
premises—as explained in Corcoran 1998: 
“Information-theoretic logic”. Other logicians 
make similar points using other words. For 
example, Cohen and Nagel wrote the following.  
The logical consequences of a proposition are not phenomena 
which follow it in time, but are rather parts of its meaning. While 
our apprehension of premises sometimes precedes that of their 
conclusion, it is also true that we often ﬁrst think of the conclusion 
and then ﬁnd premises which imply it
 On the next page, they added: “That a 
proposition has deﬁnite logical consequences 
even if it is false follows also from the fact that 
these logical consequences or implications are 
par t o f i t s meaning” .  See Cohen-Nage l 
1934/1993, p. 9. 
 At this point some readers might ask, as 
one actually did: .  
Would you agree with the following?  An argument is logically 
valid if and only if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the 
premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false. 
 I agree that an argument is valid iff every 
argument in the same form is valid. See Section 1 
above. The ambiguous word ‘form’ is used in the 
sense of Corcoran 1989: “Argumentations and 
logic”, Quine 1970: Philosophy of logic, and 
others: every argument has exactly one form. I 
would also agree that an argument is valid iff it is 
logically impossible for the premises to be true 
and the conclusion false. 
 But I have some disagreements. First, a 
minor point of rhetoric: I would not qualify 
‘valid’ with ‘logically’; it would suggest that I 
recognize other sorts of validities. This in turn 
would raise the questions of what they are, what 
are the differences among them, and what they all 
have in common that justiﬁes calling them 
validities. I prefer to set that to the side. 
 My important disagreement is with the 
naïve Platonistic suggestion that abstract logical 
forms are what make concrete arguments valid, 
that concrete arguments are valid in virtue of 
abstract form. I think this is destructive to clear 
thinking about logic; it has things backward in an 
alienating and oppressive way.
  JOHN CORCORAN |Logic teaching in the 21st century . | 13
Quadripartita Ratio: Revista de Argumentación y Retórica 1:1 (2016) 1-13 c  2016
  -  Universidad de Guadalajarawww.revistascientiﬁcas.udg.mx retorica.argumentacion@gmail.com
 A valid argument is made valid by the 
containment of its conclusion’s information in 
its premise-set’s information. To see whether a 
concrete argument is valid, students should be 
encouraged to understand its propositions and to 
see whether the conclusion’s information can be 
extracted from that of the premises or whether the 
conclusion’s information goes beyond that of the 
premises. 
 What can we call the special property of 
abs t rac t a rgument fo rms whose concre te 
instances are all valid? We cannot use ‘validity’ 
because that has been used for a property of 
concrete arguments. Calling a form valid would 
be a confusing category mistake: it would be 
ascribing to an abstract object a property 
applicable only to concrete objects. To use 
Peirce’s example, it would be like saying that a 
color has a color, e.g. saying that green is green, 
i.e., that greenness has greenness, that green has 
greenness, that greenness is green. 
 
I deﬁne an abst ract argument form to be 
omnivalid if all of its concrete instances are 
valid; nullovalid if none are valid. Every 
argument form is omnivalid or nullovalid, since 
every two arguments in the same form are either 
both valid or both invalid. 
 
I wou ld add , pa raphras ing Cohen-Nage l 
1934/1993, that it is not the form that makes the 
argument valid; it is having valid instances that 
makes the form omnivalid: the form is omnivalid 
in virtue of its valid instances; the valid instance 
is not valid in virtue of its form. Cohen-Nagel 
1934/1993 wrote the following on page 12. 
An argument is valid in virtue of the implication between 
premises and conclusion […] and not in virtue of […] the form 
which we have abstracted [sc. from it]. 
This is a good place to distinguish forms from 
schemata. See Corcoran 2006:
“Schemata”. The instances of a form are all valid 
or all invalid. But there are schemata that have 
both valid instances and invalid instances. All 
one-premise arguments , whether val id or 
invalid, are instances of the following schema. 
 P 
Q 
 
Every one-premise argument having a negation 
for its premise, whether valid or invalid, is an 
instance of the following schema. 
 
It is not the case that P 
Q 
 
Every one-premise argument having a negation 
as its conclusion, whether valid or invalid, is an 
instance of the following schema. 
 
P 
It is not the case that Q 
I deﬁne a schema whose instances are all valid to 
be panvalid, whose instances are all invalid 
paninvalid, and those among whose instances are 
found bo th va l id a rgumen t s and inva l id 
arguments neut roval id . See Cohen-Nagel 
1934/1993, Editor’s Introduction, pages xvii-
xxxvii, especially xxxi ff. 
 Needless to say the class of concrete 
arguments has no members in common with 
either the class of forms or the class of schemata. 
Moreover, the latter two are also disjoint, i.e. the 
class of forms has no member in common with the 
class of schemata. At this point, I would warn 
against thinking of omnivalidity or panvalidity 
as a kind of validity—as ‘validity’ is used here 
and in my other writings. 
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 In this work there is only one kind of 
validity and that is predicable only of concrete 
arguments. In the sense of ‘valid’ used here it 
would be an incoherency, a category mistake, to 
afﬁrm or deny that something other than concrete 
arguments is valid. For the differences between 
logical forms and schemata see Cohen-Nagel 
1934/1993, Editor’s Introduction, pages xvii-
xxxvii, especially xxxi ff. The distinction 
between an argument’s unique form and its 
mult iple schemata corresponds closely to 
Quine’s distinction between a sentence’s unique 
“entire structure” and its other “structure”, for 
example, its truth-functional structure. See 
Quine 1970, Philosophy of Logic, pp. 48f. Also 
see Tarski-Givant 1987, pp. 43f. 
 Returning to the above four arguments 
that premise “every person fol lows some 
person”, it would be interesting to discuss them 
and the inﬁnitude of others constructed using the 
same transformations: i.e., taking a previously 
constructed relative clause beginning ‘who 
follows …’ and inserting it after the noun 
‘person’.  But before going on we should express 
in variable-enhanced language the proposition 
expressed using the relative clause attached to 
the subject in the following. 
 
every person who follows some person follows 
some person 
every person x who follows some person y 
follows some person z 
every person x who follows some person y is such 
that x follows some person z 
every person x who is such that x follows some 
person y is then such that x follows some person z 
every person x is such that if x follows some 
person y, then x follows some person z 
every person x is such that if, for some person y, x 
follows y, then for some person z, x follows z 
The above relative clauses are all restrictive, so 
called because, in typical cases, they restrict the 
extension of the noun-phrase they terminate: the 
extension of ‘person who follows some person’ is 
typically a proper subset of the extension of 
‘person’. Restrictive relative clauses are never 
set off by commas.  
But, as we learned in grammar class, there are 
attributive relative clauses that are always set off 
by commas and that are never parts of noun 
phrases. 
 
every person leads some person 
every person follows some person 
every person, who follows some person, leads 
some person 
 
every person leads some person 
every person follows some person 
every person, who leads some person, follows 
some person 
 
 
every person, who leads some person, follows 
some person  
every person follows some person  
 
every person, who leads some person, follows 
some person  
every person leads some person  
 
every person, who leads some person, follows 
some person  
every person leads some person and follows 
some person 
 
T h e  p r o p o s i t i o n — e x p r e s s e d  u s i n g  t h e 
comma—“every person, who leads some person, 
follows some person” contains exactly the same 
information as “every person leads some person 
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and every person follows some person”.In 
contrast, the proposition—expressed without 
the comma—“every person who leads some 
person follows some person” does not even 
imply “every person leads some person and 
follows some person”. In fact, the proposition 
“every person who leads some person follows 
some person” is implied by “every person 
follows some person”. But of course, the 
proposition “every person, who leads some 
person, follows some person” is not implied by 
“every person fol lows some person”. For 
applications of these ideas to Peano and Gödel, 
see Sagüillo 1999, Sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
 
There are many pitfalls in variable-enhanced 
English and many of those pitfalls are made even 
more dangerous when the inevitable sentence-
abbrev ia t ing occurs . Af te r a l l , va r i ab le -
e n h a n c e d E n g l i s h i s n ’ t E n g l i s h a n d t h e 
“intuitions” that are reliable in English often 
need tweaking, or amending before being 
applied to variable-enhanced English. The 
following sentences express one and the same 
proposi t ion: they al l ar ise from variable-
e n h a n c e m e n t o f t h e s a m e p l a i n - E n g l i s h 
sentence. 
every person x follows some person y 
every person y follows some person z 
every person z follows some person x 
 There are various ways that a tyro can 
misunderstand these and conclude not only that 
they don’t express the same proposition but that 
their propositions are logically independent as 
are the following. The variables occupy places 
normally reserved for participles or something 
that can replace a participle. 
every person walking follows some person jogging 
every person jogging follows some person running 
every person running follows some person walking 
 
 
When a batch of variable-enhanced sentences all 
involve one and the same common noun, as these 
all involve only ‘person’, it is natural to leave the 
noun “understood”. To read them, the noun must 
be restored “by the mind”—to use Tarski’s 
terminology from his 1941 Introduction. 
every x follows some y 
every y follows some z 
every z follows some x 
 
A person’s “English intuition” feels that the 
letters x, y, and z are nouns and the sentences are 
converted into spoken English somewhat as 
follows. [The word ‘whigh’ below names ‘y’ and 
rhymes with high, nigh, sigh, thigh, etc.] 
 
every ecks follows some whigh 
every whigh follows some zee 
every zee follows some ecks 
 
  
 Mis lead ing the s tudent to th ink of 
variables as common nouns is even more likely 
when the variables are put into plural form as in 
‘all xs follow some ys’ without an apostrophe or 
‘ a l l  x ’ s  f o l l o w  s o m e  y ’ s ’  w i t h  a n 
apostrophe—pronounced “all eckses follow 
some whighs”. There is another problem with 
pluralizing a variable using the apostrophe: that 
form is already used as a possessive as in ‘if x is 
even, x’s successor is odd’. To the best of my 
knowledge, no English noun pluralizes using 
apostrophe-ess. 
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 Closely related to the mistake of treating 
variables as common nouns is the mistake of 
treating common nouns as proper names of sets. 
This can happen several ways: one is to write ‘for 
every x ε person’ instead of ‘for every person x’; 
another even worse is to write ‘for every x, if x ε 
person’. This is not grammatically correct 
variable-enhanced English. Moreover, it creates 
typographical clutter and it sets a scientistic tone 
inconsistent with autonomous judgment and 
independent thinking. We don’t honor our heroes 
by mindlessly repeating their mistakes. In this 
case, Peano seems to be the originator of these 
mistakes (Quine 1987). 
 The logic teacher will want to be alert for 
students falling into pitfalls. Every time a student 
falls into a pitfall, the teacher has an opportunity 
to instruct the class in the intricacies of variable-
enhanced English and the logical analysis of 
English.   
 Logic teaching in the 21st century will 
look for opportunities to connect logic with other 
things the student has previously learned. For 
example, in language, composition, rhetoric, 
classics, history, and other classes, a student 
might learn Quintil ian’s four fundamental 
t e x t u a l  o p e r a t i o n s :  a d d i t i o n ,  d e l e t i o n , 
substitution, and transposition. These four 
w o r d s  r e p r e s e n t  m y  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f 
Quintilian’s meanings not a translation of his 
words. Other English words are just as good: 
insertion, extraction, replacement, permutation. 
For operation, transformation would do as well.   
 The Latin words Quintilian uses are 
adiectio, detractio, mutatio, and ordinatio. 
The te rminology i s no t ﬁxed . Quin t i l i an 
96?/1920 observed that these four operations can 
be used to improve the rhetorical effectiveness of 
sentences (op. cit. IX. iii. 27) and that they can be 
misused to undermine e ffec t iveness and 
introduce errors (op. cit. I. v. 8). The Latin words 
Quadripartita Ratio in the title of our journal are 
Quintilian’s alluding to four transformations.   
 All four were used in this paper. The 
transitions to, from, and among the six variable-
enhanced translations of ‘every person follows 
some person’ illustrate all four of Quintilian’s 
transformation types: (1) addition of variables 
and (2) deletion, (3) substitution of ‘every person 
x is such that’ for ‘for every person x’, (4) 
transposition of ‘for some person x’. These 
transitions call to mind the meaning-preserving 
transformations in Zellig Harris’s “discourse 
analysis” that led via his student Noam Chomsky 
to modern transformational grammars. See 
Corcoran 1972, “Harris on the Structures of 
Language”. 
 T h e  ﬁ r s t  t w o — u n d e r  t h e  n a m e s 
lengthening and shortening (or ellipsis)—are 
discussed and exempliﬁed in several of my 
papers, e.g. Corcoran 2003, p.266:  
Given two sentences expressing one and the same proposition, 
often one corresponds more closely to the logical form of the 
proposition than the other. Often one reveals more of the logical 
structure of the proposition or contains fewer logically irrelevant 
c o n s t i t u e n t s .  S o m e o f  t h e  e a s i e s t  e x a m p l e s  o f  t h e 
grammatical–logical discrepancy are found in the so-called 
elliptical sentences that have been shortened for convenience or 
in the so-called expletive sentences that have been redundantly 
lengthened for emphasis or for some other rhetorical purpose. 
 Moreover, logic teaching in the 21st 
century will look for opportunities to make the 
student aware of the fact that logic can enrich the 
student’s understanding of all previous learning. 
Awareness of logical issues can be like a sixth 
sense making other senses more vivid.  
 The issue of the attributive/restrictive 
distinctions is an apt example. Let us pause here 
t o  r e v i e w s o m e a t t r i b u t i v e / r e s t r i c t i v e 
distinctions and the structural ambiguities 
requiring them. In this paper, when ‘concrete’ 
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and ‘abstract’ are used with the common.noun 
‘argument’ they are used attributively, but when 
‘valid’ and ‘omnivalid’ are used with the same 
common noun they are used restrictively. Thus, 
“Every concrete argument has its abstract form” 
is logically equivalent to “Every argument, 
which is concrete, has i ts form, which is 
abstract”. However, “Every valid argument has 
its omnivalid form” is logically equivalent to 
“Every argument that is valid has its form that is 
omnivalid”. 
 The adjective-noun phrase is structurally 
ambiguous. It has ‘attributive’ and ‘restrictive’ 
u s e s  a s  e x p l a i n e d  i n  C o r c o r a n  2 0 0 9 : 
“Ambiguity: Lexical and Structural”. 
I n  s o m e  c a s e s ,  c a l l e d  a t t r i b u t i v e  b y 
grammar ians , the impl ica t ion i s tha t the 
adjective applies to everything coming under the 
noun: “Every concrete argument has its abstract 
form” implies “Every argument is concrete” and 
“Every form is abstract”. The point of attributive 
usage is often rhetorical, pedagogical, and 
expository: to remind the reader of an adjective 
previously applied to everything in the noun’s 
e x t e n s i o n — t h e e x t e n s i o n o f  ‘ c o n c r e t e 
argument’ is the same as that of ‘argument’. 
 In other cases, called restrictive by 
grammarians, the implication is not that the 
adjective applies to everything coming under the 
noun: “Every valid argument has its omnivalid 
form” does not imply “Every argument is valid” 
and it does not imply “Every form is omnivalid”.  
I n f a c t ,  t o t h e c o n t r a r y, a s a m a t t e r o f 
conversational implicature in the Grice sense, it 
suggests or “implicates” the opposite, i.e. “Not 
every argument is valid” and “Not every form is 
omnivalid”. See Grice 1989, pp. 24ff. The point 
of restrictive usage is often qualiﬁcational: to 
restrict the noun’s extension—the extension of 
‘valid argument’ is a proper subset of that of 
‘argument’. See Sagüillo 1999 and Corcoran 
2009: “Ambiguity: Lexical and Structural”. 
 As said above it is important to note, however, 
that although in this paper, whenever  ‘concrete’ 
and ‘abstract’ are used with the common noun 
‘argument’, they are used attributively, other 
works differ. That said, nevertheless, in this and 
every other work I can think of, whenever 
‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ are used with very 
general common nouns such as ‘object’, ‘entity’, 
‘individual’, ‘substance’, etc., they are used 
restrictively. In fact, some writers seem to think 
that abstract objects and concrete objects are 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of 
reality. 
 Some older logic texts used the words 
explicative and determinative for occurrences of 
adject ives closely related to those cal led 
attributive and restrictive above. Roughly, 
whereas attributive and restrictive concern the 
structure of the proposition, explicative and 
determinative concern the structure of the reality 
b e i n g d i s c u s s e d — i n t h e c a s e o f  a  t r u e 
proposition, the structure of the fact. See Watts 
1725/1790, Logick, Part II, Ch. II, Sect V. 
 The topic of structural ambiguity—also 
called amphiboly and amphibology—is a rich 
one whose surface was hardly scratched above. 
In fact, there are many more things to teach and to 
learn about the structural ambiguity of the 
adjective-noun construction: every individual 
student is a student and, conversely, every 
student is an individual student. This example 
and those above bring to mind one of the most 
embarrassing chapters in the history of logic: the 
one titled “The law of inverse variation of 
intension and extension”. See Cohen-Nagel 
1934/1993, page 33. 
 Above I said that logic teaching in the 21st 
century will look for opportunities to connect    
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logic with other things the student has previously 
learned. This section (§ 4) alone gives evidence 
of log ic’s re levance and appl icabi l i ty to 
grammar, rhetoric, and argumentation.
§5. Mathematical propositions, arguments, 
deductions, and counterarguments 
Since x + 2 = 2 + x for any number x, it is true for some number x. 
Thus, as used here, any implies some and some does not exclude 
any.   — Whitehead (1911/1948, 8) 
 
Another welcome development is the culmination of the slow 
demise of logicism. No longer is the teacher blocked from using 
examples from arithmetic and algebra fearing that the students 
had been indoctrinated into thinking that every mathematical 
truth was a tautology and that every mathematical falsehood was a 
contradiction. 
 O u r  s t u d e n t s  a l r e a d y k n o w s o m e 
elementary mathematics. Logic teaching in the 
21st century can follow Tarski’s lead—in his 
Introduction to Logic (Tarski 1941/1995)—by 
building on that knowledge, extending it, and 
using extensions of it to illustrate logical 
principles and methods. It is an insult to our 
students to teach as if a l i t t le elementary 
mathematics is beyond their abilities or worse 
that warm and fuzzy examples will appeal to 
them. Our students already know the laws of 
commutativity and associativity of addition of 
integers in forms such as the following taken 
from elementary textbooks (Tarski 1941/1995, 
Sect. 3). 
 
C1: Commutativity: x [Símbolo] y [Símbolo]  y + 
x 
A1: Associa t iv i ty : (x [S ímbolo] (y + z) ) 
[Símbolo] ((x [Símbolo] y) + z) 
 
 There are so many useful, important, and 
enriching things to say in a logic course about 
these laws of arithmetic it is hard to choose where 
to start. The ﬁrst thing to do perhaps is to expand 
these highly-compressed elliptical sentences 
into variable-enhanced natural language. Tarski 
emphasizes that natural languages can express 
anything expressible in a formalized language 
and that there are many pedagogical advantages 
in translating a formula into natural language. In 
fact, in many passages he seemed to say that 
f o r m a l i s m s  w e r e  a b b r e v i a t i o n s  o f 
colloquialisms. 
 
C2: Where x and y are integers, x plus y is y plus x.  
 
 Since the initial sentence C1 has no 
singular/plural feature and since standard ﬁrst-
order sentences are generally translated using 
the singular grammatical “number”, it is worth 
exploring a singular form. 
 
C3: Where x is an integer, where y is an integer, x 
plus y is y plus x.  
 
Do C2 and C3 express the same proposition as 
C1? Do C2 and C3 express the same proposition? 
Do C2 and C3 have the same consequences?  
 
 Is there any connection between the 
contrast of C2 with C3 and the contrast between 
the two-place quantiﬁer [Símbolo]xy and the 
o n e - p l a c e  q u a n t i ﬁ e r  r e p e a t e d 
[Símbolo]x[Símbolo]y as in Tarski 1941/1995? 
 The students will notice that the sentence 
C3 is very close to the sentence C4 below, where 
the second quantiﬁcation comes at the end. They 
will also notice (1) that C4 is a little more natural 
and (2) that it exempliﬁes the fact that in 
variable-enhanced language the quantiﬁcations 
often follow the variable-occurrences they bind. 
 C4: Where x is an integer, x plus y is y plus x, 
where y is an integer. 
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  Asking the students why formalized 
language differs from natural language in 
quant iﬁcat ion locat ion aler ts them to the 
phenomenon and at the same time extends the 
range of sen tences they a re comfor tab le 
symbolizing. 
 The propositions expressed by singular 
forms of the commutativity law clearly apply in 
the case of a single number that has two or more 
names: e.g., zero is named ‘+0’ and ‘-0’. Thus, the 
students have no problem deducing ‘(+0 + -0) = (-
0 + +0)’ from C1, C3, or C4. In fact, to be clear, the 
following are both valid. 
 
Where x is an integer, where y is an integer, x plus 
y is y plus x. 
Where x is an integer, where y is the same integer, 
x plus y is y plus x. 
 
Where x is an integer, where y is an integer, x plus 
y is y plus x. 
Where x is an integer, where y is a different 
integer, x plus y is y plus x. 
 
 When conversing with beginners it is 
important to recognize and val idate their 
insights. For example, some will notice that there 
is nothing to the premise of these two arguments 
besides the conclusions, i.e., the two conclusions 
together imply the premise: the following is 
valid. 
 
Where x is an integer, where y is the same integer, 
x plus y is y plus x. 
Where x is an integer, where y is a different 
integer, x plus y is y plus x. 
Where x is an integer, where y is an integer, x plus 
y is y plus x. 
 
 The earlier it is in the course the more 
important it is for the teacher to explicitly draw 
the obvious conclusions, which are often eye-
openers to the students: in this case the point to 
make is that the two premises of the last argument 
taken together are logically equivalent to the 
conclusion. The two premises just divide up the 
information in the conclusion; drawing the 
conclusion puts the information back together 
into one proposition, so to speak. See Corcoran 
1995, “Information recovery problems”. 
 However some s tudents wil l guess , 
especially when helped with some Socratic 
questioning, that the commutativity proposition 
expressed by C2 beginning with the plural 
quantiﬁer ‘Where x and y are integers’—taken 
literally—does not imply: 
 
 (+0 + -0) = (-0 + +0).  
 In other words, they will guess that the 
following premise-conclusion argument, A1 
below, is invalid—if the premise’s sentence is 
read literally. Taken literally, the expression 
‘where x and y are integers’ means the same as 
‘where x and y are different integers’. In cases 
when writers use it ﬁguratively and do not want 
‘different’ to be read in, they often add ‘not 
necessarily distinct’. This brings a new set of 
interpretational problems: ‘distinct’ is not an 
adjective expressing a property of distinctness; it 
is elliptical for ‘numerically distinct’ expressing 
the relation of numerical distinctness and the 
whole added phrase is short for ‘not necessarily 
numerically distinct from each other’. This 
interesting and important semantic issue plays 
no further role below. 
 
ARGUMENT A1 
where x and y are different integers, x plus y is y 
plus x  
+0 plus -0 is -0 plus +0  
  JOHN CORCORAN |Logic teaching in the 21st century . | 20
Quadripartita Ratio: Revista de Argumentación y Retórica 1:1 (2016) 1-20 c  2016
  -  Universidad de Guadalajarawww.revistascientiﬁcas.udg.mx retorica.argumentacion@gmail.com
 Continuing their train of thought, they 
will guess or maybe claim that the following is 
invalid. 
 
  ARGUMENT A2 
where x and y are different integers, x plus y is y 
plus x  
where x and y are the same integer, x plus y is y 
plus x  
 
 After all, some will say, each of the 
following arguments has a true premise but a 
false conclusion. 
 
  ARGUMENT B1 
where x and y are different integers, x exceeds y 
or y exceeds x  
+0 exceeds -0 or -0 exceeds +0  
 
  ARGUMENT B2 
where x and y are different integers, x exceeds y 
or y exceeds x 
where x and y are the same integer, x exceeds y or 
y exceeds x 
 
 In teaching, whenever an invalidity claim 
or guess is made, especially if it not obvious to 
everyone in the class, a counterargument should 
be given—preferably elicited from the class. 
Trying to ﬁnd a counterargument for an argument 
that appears invalid can lead to a realization that 
appearances can be misleading and that the 
argument is actually valid. Notice that argument 
B1 is a counterargument to every other argument 
in its same form and to itself. The same holds for 
B2. 
 But B1 is not in the same form as A1: B1 
has a relation “exceeds” but no operation, 
whereas A1 has an operation “plus” but no 
relation. They are however instances of one and 
the same neutrovalid schema: S1 below. 
  ARGUMENT SCHEMA S1 
where x and y are integers, R(x, y)  
R(a, b)  
 
 For background experience, it is worth 
noting the validity of two other arguments. 
 
where x and y are different integers, x plus y is y 
plus x  
if +0 isn’t -0, then +0 plus -0 is -0 plus +0  
 
where x and y are different integers, x plus y is y 
plus x  
where x is an integer, x plus y is y plus x, where y is 
an integer other than x 
 
 That being said a student might like to be 
reminded that the following is also valid. 
 
where x and y are different integers, x plus y is y 
plus x 
where x is an integer, x plus x is x plus x 
 
But the following is invalid, although +0 is -0. 
 
where x is an integer, x plus x is x plus x 
+0 plus -0 is -0 plus +0 
 
 Of course if the premise is changed by 
adding ‘and +0 is -0’, the new argument would be 
valid. Judging the old argument as if it were the 
new would be the fallacy of premise-smuggling. 
See Corcoran 1989. The invalidity of the above is 
shown using the following counterargument. 
 
where x is an integer, x minus x is x minus x 
+4 minus √4 is √4 minus +4 
 Deduction of the conclusion of Argument 
A1 from its premise, thereby establishing its 
validity, is a very easy exercise. Hint: take the 
tautology ‘+0 is -0 or +0 isn’t -0’ as the ﬁrst line   
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and use disjunctive reasoning. Once A1 is 
deduced, by adapting the same ideas, deducing 
Argument A2 will be easy. In a paper such as this, 
it is worth mentioning explicitly that ‘deducing 
an argument’ means “deducing its conclusion 
from its premise set”—as is natural and handy.  
 This discussion will give the instructor 
the opportunity to reiterate four important 
points. The ﬁrst is that many excellent logic 
texts—including the inﬂuential 1934 Cohen-
Nagel Introduction and even Tarski’s 1941 
masterpiece—treat plurals as singulars—and 
without a word of warning (Cohen-Nagel 
1934/1993, pp. 42ff. , Tarski 1941/1995, pp. 7ff). 
 The second is that literal reading of 
double universal quantiﬁcations expressed 
using  pluralized range indicators—e. g., ‘where 
x and y are integers’— is closely related to the 
“ sepa ra t ed -va r i ab le s” r ead ing o f doub le 
universal quant iﬁcat ions expressed using  
singular range indicators—‘where x is a number 
and y is a number’. The separated-variables 
reading takes the values assigned to the two 
variables to be two distinct numbers almost as if 
‘where x is a number and y is a number’ were read 
as elliptical for ‘where x is a number and y is a 
different number’. One reason for bringing this 
up is that some students are inclined to take it that 
way naturally—and thus to be out of touch with 
the class. I noticed this in my own teaching as 
have other logic teachers including Albert Visser 
(personal communication). Another reason is 
that Wittgenstein adopted a separated-variables 
app roach i n h i s 1922 Trac t a tu s Log ico -
Philosophicus. 
 The third point the instructor can make is 
that ﬁnding inattention or even inaccuracy in a 
work is no evidence that alertness and exactness, 
perhaps even brilliant creativity is not to be 
found in it also. Don’t throw the baby out with the 
bathwater. But, don’t put the bathwater in the crib 
with the baby. 
 This reminds me of what Frango Nabrasa 
calls “Newton’s Law of Fallacies”: for every 
fallacy there’s an equal and opposite fallacy. 
Trying too hard to avoid one lands you in the 
other. Falling backward is not a good way to 
avoid falling forward. “Political correctness” is 
not a good way to avoid ethnic, race, religion, 
philosophy, or gender insensitivity. 
 The fourth point, minor to the expert but 
eye-opening to the beginner, is that every integer 
has inﬁnitely many names even if we don’t count 
those made by adding any number of plus signs 
and those made by adding any even number of 
minus signs: 0 = - -0, 0 = - - - -0, etc. 
 This is a natural place to describe the 
pluralisms in logic that I advocate. The one I had 
in mind when I made the abstract and table of 
contents concerns awareness of the variety of 
classical logics actually used as underlying 
logics in traditional disciplines. In 1974 I 
discussed this pluralism and its role in historical 
research. See my 1974 “Future Research on 
Ancien t Theor ies of Communica t ion and 
Reasoning”. The most important variety of 
classical logic by far is standard one-sorted, ﬁrst-
order logic. But many-sorted logic and higher-
order logics are essential. See my 2001 “Second-
order logic”. Moreover, varieties of identity 
logics are useful for understanding the logical 
experiences students have in their algebra 
courses. See the 1979 “Identity logics” and the 
2015 “Teaching basic logics”. We may call this 
classical pluralism: recognizing the variety of 
classical logics that can serve as underlying 
logics humans actually use in their intellectual 
lives. 
 A n o t h e r f o r m o f p l u r a l i s m I h a v e 
advocated may be called disciplinary pluralism.  
  JOHN CORCORAN |Logic teaching in the 21st century . | 22
Quadripartita Ratio: Revista de Argumentación y Retórica 1:1 (2016) 1-22 c  2016
  -  Universidad de Guadalajarawww.revistascientiﬁcas.udg.mx retorica.argumentacion@gmail.com
This is the recognition that in the development of 
the many disciplines—arithmetic, geometry, set 
theory, etc.—there is no “one-size-ﬁts-all” 
underlying logic; rather each classical discipline 
has its own classical underlying logic. For 
example, the logic of arithmetic differs from that 
o f  g e o m e t r y  i n  s e v e r a l  w a y s .  O n e 
metamathematically important way is that 
arithmetic has proper names for all of its objects 
but geometry has proper names for none of its 
objects—a point I learned from Tarski. See, for 
example, my 1973 “Gaps between logical theory 
and mathematical practice”. 
 Applying this philosophy to teaching 
excludes presentation to undergraduates of 
“superlogics” such as the “functional calculus of 
ﬁrst order” in Section 30 of Church 1956. These 
logics were constructed to achieve a maximum of 
generality but the result is alienating artiﬁciality 
and ugly clutter. They have inﬁnitely many 
classes of primitive symbols and each class is 
inﬁnite. For example, for each number n, there 
are inﬁnitely many n-placed predicate symbols. 
It would take years of study for a student to be 
able to see such “classical” logics as responding 
to any goal in classical logic implicit in the 
tradition founded by Aristotle. This kind of 
exclusion applies to many other “classical” 
logics including those in Tarski 1941/1995 and  
 Quine 1970. I recommend that teachers 
avoid idiosyncratic, exotic, esoteric, artiﬁcial, 
unintuitive, or overly general forms of classical, 
Aristotelian, two-valued logics—call them what 
you want—to undergraduates. Try logics that 
help the student to discover logical reality and to 
get in touch with their own inner logician. 
 A n o t h e r f o r m o f p l u r a l i s m I h a v e 
advocated may be called analytical pluralism. 
This is the recognition that many a natural-
language sentence used in a given discipline may 
be used to express different propositions and thus 
admit of a plurality of analyses: there is no “one-
s ize-ﬁts-a l l” logical analys is for a g iven 
sentence. Rather in each context one must do a 
new analysis—sometimes more than one in the 
same context. The question “what is the logical 
form of this sentence?” makes the usually-false 
presupposition that “this sentence” has only one 
logical form. We should ask “what are the logical 
forms of the propositions expressed by this 
sentence?”. 
 For the record, I do not advocate teaching 
e x o t i c ,  e s o t e r i c ,  n o n - c l a s s i c a l ,  n o n -
Aristotelian, deviant logics—call them what you 
want—to undergraduates who have not mastered 
articulations of their own inner logics. See Quine 
1970 on deviant logics. This would be like 
teaching non-Euclidean geometries to students 
who had not yet developed their classical 
Euclidean intuitions. Maybe it would be more 
like teaching “languages” that were never used 
for communication and never will be. Again, 
perhaps it would be like feeding unhealthy 
commercial snacks to children who were still 
struggling to appreciate healthy home-cooked 
foods. There are other analogies that are even 
more negative.  
 Anyway, the pluralism that advocates 
teaching exotic non-classical logic to beginners 
is one I ﬁnd counter-productive or worse. It 
alienates students from logical reality and 
prevents them from learning the logic they need 
in their lives. I call it adventurist pluralism.  
That said, I hasten to add that I am far from 
condemning non-classical logics. That non-
classical logics play fruitful roles in modern 
logical research is well established, as is 
explained, for example, in my 1973 “Gaps 
between logical theory and mathematical 
practice”.  Moreover, notice that I have not said 
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classical logics are perfect models of human 
logical competence. On the contrary, I have said 
that they are not and how they are not—in the 
1973 paper just mentioned and elsewhere—a 
point I will return to in my Conclusion below. 
 Moreover, let us not forget that our basic 
mathematical sciences presuppose classical 
underlying logics. For example, in number 
theory the great proofs including that of Fermat’s 
Last Theorem use classical logic. Also, in 
mathematical logic, proofs of the great meta-
theorems of Gödel, Tarski, Craig, and Henkin 
were not only classical in their reasoning but they 
were about classical logics.  
 L e t  u s w r a p u p t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f 
commutativity and associativity by explaining 
how their independence is established using the 
method of counterarguments as described in 
various places including Corcoran 1989. The 
ﬁrst step is to express them in full explicitly using 
a range-indicator: ‘I’ for ‘integer’. To show that 
c o m m u t a t i v i t y  d o e s  n o t  f o l l o w  f r o m 
associativity, consider the following. 
 
 
 
The goal is to produce another argument in the 
same logical form with a premise known to be 
true and a conclusion known to be false.  
 For our universe of discourse, or range of 
values of our variables, we choose the strings of 
letters of the alphabet and take ‘S’, abbreviating 
‘ S t r i n g ’ ,  a s  o u r  r a n g e - i n d i c a t o r .  T h u s 
‘[Símbolo]Sx’ means “for every string x”. For 
our two-place operat ion corresponding to 
addition we take concatenation: the result of 
concatenating the two-character string ‘ab’ to the 
three-character string ‘cde’ is the ﬁve-character 
string ‘abcde’. Using the made-up word ‘concat’ 
for this operation, we can say that ‘ab’ concat 
‘cde’ is ‘abcde’. Using the arch ‘ᴖ’ for “concat”, 
we have the equation (identity): 
 
‘ab’ ᴖ ‘cde’ = ‘abcde’ 
Our counterargument is thus the following. 
 
 
 A little thought about strings reveals the 
truth of the premise. The falsity of the conclusion 
is seen by noting that it implies the following. 
 
‘ab’ ᴖ ‘cde’ = ‘cde’ ᴖ‘ab’  
 
 But, ‘abcde’ isn’t ‘cdeab’: the ﬁrst begins 
with ‘a’, but the second begins with ‘c’. Similar 
deliberations show that commutativity does not 
imply associativity. 
 
The method of counterarguments was routinely 
a n d r e p e a t e d l y u s e d i n p r a c t i c e a l m o s t 
instinctively before the theory used to describe it 
was developed. In fact, the method came before 
anyone mentioned logical forms of arguments. 
Indeed, the deﬁnition of being-in-the-same-
form-as is of recent origin. See “Logical form” in 
Audi 2015. One of the theoretical principles 
presupposed by this method is that in order for an 
argument to be valid it is necessary and sufﬁcient 
for every argument in the same form to be valid. 
 
In teaching, the order of presentation should 
follow the historical order of discovery—at  
least this is a point Tarski stressed. 
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 §6. Logical propositions, arguments, 
deductions, and counterarguments 
But many mathematicians seem to have so little feeling for logical 
purity and accuracy that they will use a word to stand for three or 
four different things, sooner than make the frightful decision to 
invent a new word.—Frege 1893/1967, Sect. 60 
   
A further welcome development is the separation of laws of logic 
from so-called logical truths, i.e., tautologies. Now we can teach 
the logical independence of the laws of excluded middle and non-
contradiction without fear that students had been indoctrinated 
into thinking that every logical law was a tautology and that every 
falsehood of logic was a contradiction. This separation permits 
the logic teacher to apply logic in the clariﬁcation of laws of logic. 
 Before treating the content of this topic it 
is necessary to reveal an embarrassing feature of 
the literature of logic. When a publication uses a 
familiar expression, the writer has certain 
responsibilities to the reader. Moreover when 
those responsibilities are not met, reviewers 
have the responsibility to point this out and to 
criticize the publication. The expressions of 
immedia te re levance are the law of non-
contradiction—some say contradiction, without 
the non—and the law of excluded-middle—some 
say excluded- third. Use of these without further 
explanation, especially in introductory contexts, 
presupposes that those expressions have ﬁxed, 
generally agreed upon meanings and that the 
reader knows what those meanings are. Even if 
the publication explicit ly says what these 
expressions are taken to denote, it is still 
inexcusably misleading not to warn the reader 
that these expressions have been used over 
centuries in many, perhaps a dozen or more, 
w a y s . E v e n w o r s e , d i f f e r e n t s e n s e s a r e 
associated with different philosophies of logic. 
 Take the expression the law of contradiction. 
For centuries the ambiguous expression Law of 
contradiction (or non-contradiction) denoted (1) 
assertoric propositions such as  
         No proposition is both true and false, 
 
(2) modalized versions  with ‘can be’ for 
‘is’—and (3) very different modals such as  
 
It is impossible that a property belonging to an 
individual at 
a time does not belong to the individual at that 
same time. 
   
This gives us three classes of uses , each 
containing two or more variants. But these three 
have been confused with others, three of which 
are mentioned here. 
 
(4) No proposition is such that it and its negation 
are both true. 
(5) No proposit ion is such that i t and i ts 
contradictory are both true. 
(6) No proposition is both true and not true. 
 
 However, Boole used the expression for 
an equation in class algebra, thus creating a 
seventh class of referents [Corcoran-Legault 
2013]. This ambiguity persisted for decades—as 
Cohen and Nagel’s popular and inﬂuential 1934 
Introduction attests. 
   U s i n g t e r m i n o l o g y f r o m Ta r s k i ’s 
Introduction, the ﬁrst class has the variant: 
   
 No sentence is both true and false. 
 
T h i s  l a w i s  u n m i s t a k a b l y p r e s u p p o s e d 
throughout Tarski’s Chapters I and II, especially 
in Section 13 about truth-tables. Astoundingly, 
n o  s u c h  s e n t e n c e  o c c u r s  i n  Ta r s k i ’ s 
Introduction. Also conspicuously missing is an 
explicit statement that no sentential-function is 
satisﬁed and not satisﬁed by the same object.
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Absence of reference to any traditional law in 
Chapters I and II suggests the hypothesis that 
Tarski deliberately avoided mentioning it.  
 Another curious fact is that Tarski’s 
Section 13 appropriated the expression Law of 
contradiction for a law which doesn’t involve the 
words true and false or even symbolic renderings 
thereof—creating an eighth class of senses. 
Tarski abbreviated the law:  
 
   ~[ p ˄  (~p)] 
 
S t a t e d f u l l y u s i n g Ta r s k i ’s i n s t r u c t i o n s 
[3,Section 13]. 
 
 for any sentence p, ~[ p ˄  (~p)] 
 
 Another peculiarity is that Tarski avoids 
any clues about English translations of this 
perplexing sentence: its variables’s values are 
exact ly the same as their subst i tuents—a 
peculiarity making the sentence difﬁcult if not 
impossible to grasp. Having a variable’s values 
being its substituents is a kind of use-mention 
conﬂation: a variable’s substituents are used to 
mention its values. For example, in arithmetic, 
the individual variables have numbers as values 
and numerals as substituents: the number zero is 
a value of the variable having the numeral ‘0’ as a 
substituent. Values are things in the universe of 
d i s c o u r s e  o f  a n  i n t e r p r e t e d  l a n g u a g e ; 
substituents are names in that language. 
 Tarski’s writing suggests, especially to 
beginners, that this strange and perplexing 
expression is what is normally called the law of 
contradiction. 
 H a v i n g  d i s p e n s e d  s o m e  o f  o u r 
terminological responsibilities, let us turn to the 
main topic of this Section. The law of non-
contradiction—“no proposition is both true and 
f a l s e ” — a n d  t h e  l a w  o f  e x c l u d e d -
middle—“every proposition is either true or 
false”—are both laws of logic but neither is a 
tautology, or logical truth in the broad sense.  
 Every proposition in the same form as a 
tautology is a tautology and therefore a truth. But 
each of those two laws is in the same form as 
falsehoods: “no triangle is both equilateral and 
equiangular” is false and so is “every triangle is 
either equilateral or equiangular”. 
 People who think that every law of logic is 
a tautology are apt to think that, since all 
tautologies are logically equivalent, all laws of 
logic are logically equivalent. But to see that 
noncontradict ion doesn’t imply excluded-
middle it is sufﬁcient to see that the following 
argument is invalid.  
 no proposition is both true and false 
 every proposition is either true or false 
 
To see that this argument is invalid it is sufﬁcient 
to see that it has a counterargument: an argument 
in the same form with a true premise and false 
conclusion. 
 
no integer is both positive and negative 
every integer is either positive or negative 
 
To see that a universal proposition is false it is 
sufﬁcient to see that it has a counterexample: in 
this case an object that satisﬁes the subject but 
dissatisﬁes the predicate. Zero is an integer that 
is not either positive or negative. 
 Thus noncontradiction does not imply 
excluded-middle. In other words, excluded-
middle does not follow from noncontradiction; 
the argument having noncontradiction as its only 
premise and excluded-middle as its conclusion is 
invalid.  
 The same method shows that excluded-
middle does not imply noncontradiction. 
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Inc identa l ly, th is example i l lus t ra tes the 
importance of distinguishing counterargument 
from counterexample. But, this should not be 
taken to imply that no counterarguments are 
counterexamples . On the cont rary, every 
counterargument for a given argument is a 
counterexample to the universal proposition that 
every argument in the same form as the given 
argument is valid. 
 Once methods and results have been 
presented, some succinct exercises are needed.  
Preferable exercises are that (1) maximize 
creative use of what has been learned and that (2) 
minimize writing. For these and other related 
r e a s o n s ,  a l t e r n a t i v e - c o n s t i t u e n t f o r m a t 
questions are often appropriate. Here is one 
relevant example. 
 
The law of (excluded-middle * noncontradiction) is logically 
equivalent to “every proposition that (is not * is) true (is not * is) 
false”. 
 
Alternative-constituent exercises can often be made more 
demanding as exempliﬁed below. 
 
The law of (excluded-middle * noncontradiction) is logically 
equivalent to “every proposition that (is not * is) (true *false) (is 
not * is) (false * true)”. 
 
The law of (excluded-middle * noncontradiction) is logically 
(equivalent to * independent of) “every proposition that (is not * 
is) (true *false) (is not * is) (false * true)”. 
 
Further discussion and applicat ion of the 
alternative-constituent format is found in my 
2008 “Meanings of form”, Corcoran 2009, and 
Corcoran-Main 2011. 
Conclusion 
 
As is evident by now to many readers, this essay 
d o e s  n o t  i n t e n d  t o  b e  d e ﬁ n i t i v e  o r 
comprehensive. It is more like a contribution to a 
dialogue. What did I leave out? Every reader will 
have an answer. 
One glaring omission is the importance of 
memorization. My logical life has been enriched 
by reﬂecting on texts that I had memorized. 
Students have only the fuzziest idea of what the 
axiomatic method is unless they know of 
concrete examples. The ﬁrst step in acquiring 
objectual knowledge of an axiom system is to 
memorize one. I require my students to memorize 
two axiom systems for arithmetic: the ﬁve Peano 
postulates and the three Gödel axioms used in his 
1931 incompleteness paper. See the Editor’s 
In t roduct ion to Cohen-Nagel 1934/1993: 
Introduction to Logic. Once concrete examples 
are before the mind many questions come into 
focus and axiomatic method is promoted from 
being a topic of loose conversation to being an 
object for investigation. I also recommend 
memorizing Euclid’s axioms and postulates. 
These three examples of creative memorization 
are just the beginning.  Another important topic 
that has not been treated is something that has 
already been absorbed into logic teaching and 
that doesn’t need to be recommended: teaching 
natural-deduction logic as opposed to axiomatic 
logic.  If I had more time, I would discuss the 
enormous mathematical, philosophical, and 
heur i s t ic advantages of Jaśkowski - s ty le 
sentential natural deduction. It is impossible to 
exaggerate the importance of Jaśkowski’s 
insights—especially in my own thinking and 
research: I use them almost every day. See my 
three-part series Corcoran 1971: “Discourse 
Grammars and the Structure of Mathematical 
Reasoning”. 
 Teaching a well-crafted, intuitive, and user-
f r i e n d l y J a ś k o w s k i - s t y l e s e n t e n t i a l n a t u r a l 
deduction system can awaken a student’s sense of 
logical reality and overcome the alienating effects of 
artiﬁcial approaches—truth-tables, trees, semantic 
t a b l e a u x ,  s e q u e n t  c a l c u l i , Tu r i n g - m a c h i n e 
i m p l e m e n t a b l e  a l g o r i t h m s ,  e t c . 
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There have been several small but important 
innovations in making natural deduction systems 
more natural. One is the recognition that indirect 
deduction is a special form of deduction not to be 
s u b s u m e d u n d e r  n e g a t i o n  i n t e l i m [ s c . 
introduction-and-elimination] rules. Another is 
the recognition that deduction is a goal-directed 
activity and that goal-setting is an essential step. 
Both of these points are developed in my 2009 
“Aris to t le’s Demonstra t ive Logic” where 
special notational devices for indirect deduction 
and for goal-setting appear in print for the ﬁrst 
time. It would be a mistake of the sort already 
criticized to think that currently available 
Jaśkowski-style systems cannot be made more 
realistic and thus more user-friendly. 
 Artiﬁcial approaches based on axiomatic 
logics, sequent logics, tree-logics, and the like 
are out of place in undergraduate logic. Such 
systems, of course , have their legi t imate 
m a t h e m a t i c a l  u s e s .  F o r  a n  i n t e r e s t i n g 
discussion, see Dummett 1973, pp. 430ff. 
Moreover, knowledge of some of them is 
essential not only for certain advanced research 
but also for understanding the history of logic 
and the evolution of philosophy of logic. 
Nevertheless, as Michael Dummett emphasized 
in regard to axiomatic logics, their artiﬁciality 
needs to be exposed so that a false view of logic is 
n o t c o n v e y e d a s a n o fﬁ c i a l l y - c o n d o n e d 
viewpoint (Dummett 1973, pp. 432-434). 
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 Logic research in the 21st century is 
becoming more and more a communal activity as 
opposed to the solitary personal activity it was in 
the past. Before this century, with very rare 
exceptions, logical works were single-authored. 
In this century multiple-authored works are 
common and even single-authored works often 
have an acknowledgements section listing 
colleagues that contributed. Moreover, logic 
research in the 21st century is also becoming 
more and more an international activity.  In fact, 
in this century we have multiple-authored works 
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for which the authors a re f rom di fferent 
countries. Finally, logic research in the 21st 
c e n t u r y  i s  b e c o m i n g  m o r e  a n d  m o r e 
interdisciplinary: logicians are listening more to 
the criticisms of logic made by their colleagues 
and logicians are responding to the logical needs 
of a broader community. 
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